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Abstract
In spite of its rare entry into both official and public discourses about 
contemporary Zimbabwe, ethnicity, alongside race, has continued to 
shape and influence the economic, social, and political life of Zimbabwe 
since the achievement of independence in 1980. In this article we argue 
that whilst post-independence Zimbabwe has since the days of the 
Gukurahundi war (1982-1986) not experienced serious ethnic-based wars 
or political instability, there is serious ethnic polarisation in the country 
and ethnicity remains one of the challenges to the survival of both the 
state and the country. This ethnic polarisation is to be explained mainly 
in terms of the broader failure by the state to develop an effective response 
to the political economy of ethnicity inherited from the colonial past. 
* The subtitle of this article is derived from Alexander Kanengoni’s brilliant, semi-bio-
graphical novel about the rarely discussed violence and trauma of the war of independence, 
Echoing Silences (Baobab Books, Harare, 1997). 
** Dr Muzondidya is a senior research specialist in the Democracy and Governance pro-
gramme of the Human Sciences Research Council. His research interests are in migration, 
citizenship and identities. Dr Ndlovu-Gatsheni is a Lecturer in African Studies at the 
Ferguson Centre for African and Asian Studies at The Open University, Milton Keynes, 
United Kingdom. He has published extensively on Zimbabwean history and contempo-
rary politics, focusing on governance, nationalism and Ndebele identity politics.
276
James Muzondidya and Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni
As with most postcolonial African nationalist governments which have 
come to be haunted by ethnicity, such as Rwanda, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and most recently Kenya and South Africa, the 
postcolonial government of Zimbabwe has largely remained reluctant to 
engage ethnicity as an issue in both politics and the economy, particu-
larly with regard to addressing historical and contemporary factors that 
continued to make ethnicity an important issue in people’s lives. The 
nationalist government’s state-building project, especially its coercive 
mobilisation and nation-building projects of the early 1980s, paid little 
attention to the ethnic configuration of the inherited state, as well as 
the structures and institutions which enacted and reproduced ethnicity. 
Such neglected processes, structures and institutions included unequal 
development of the provinces and the marginalisation of particular 
ethnic groups in politics, economy and society.
Introduction
Until recently, Zimbabweans have been conspicuously silent about ques-
tions of ethnicity. As in the colonial period, especially during the days of 
the nationalist liberation struggle, all attempts to discuss ethnic identi-
ties, especially their manifestation in the political and economic spheres, 
were brushed aside. Yet, ethnicity has continued to shape and influence 
the economic, social, and political life of Zimbabwe since the achieve-
ment of independence in 1980. This chapter seeks to discuss the influence 
of ethnicity in post-independence Zimbabwe. More specifically, it tries 
to understand why ethnic identities have continued to be important in 
the everyday lives of Zimbabwe. It does so by discussing the processes 
that have continued to enact, reproduce and reconstruct ethnic identities 
as well as ethnicity in Zimbabwe’s post-colonial period.
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The colonial background of ethnicity in  
post-colonial Zimbabwe
The roots of ethnic tensions and divisions that characterise Zimbabwean 
politics and society today cannot be understood outside the context of 
two broad historical interludes: the colonial and African nationalist 
interludes which, through their socio-economic and political engi-
neering projects, both helped to polarise existing ethnic identities. 
In both processes, pre-colonial social formations, especially the history of 
interaction among the various groups scattered across the Zimbabwean 
plateau, was used to provide the ideological basis for these social and 
political engineering processes. To understand how and why ethnicity 
was politicised during this period, we need to look at each of these 
specific historical junctures.
Rhodesian colonialism did not invent ethnic groups or divisions in 
Zimbabwe. Like many pre-colonial African societies, present-day 
Zimbabwe was a multi-ethnic society inhabited by a number of Ndebele 
and Shona-speaking groups. Some of these groups were the Shangani/
Tsonga in the south-eastern parts of the plateau; the Venda in the south; 
the Tonga in the north; and the Kalanga and Ndebele in the southwest. 
The Shona-speaking groups included a number of sub-ethnic/linguistic 
groups: the Karanga inhabiting the southern parts of the plateau; the 
Zezuru and Korekore inhabiting the northern and central parts of the 
plateau, now constituting the administrative provinces of Mashonaland 
West and Mashonaland East and Mashonaland Central; and the Manyika 
and Ndau in the east, the area now known as Manicaland (Beach 1994; 
Ranger 1989). The political and economic relationships among the 
various groups inhabiting the plateau were always dynamic and changing. 
Their complex and fluid relations were characterised by both conflict 
and cooperation; both incorporation and fragmentation – as facilitated 
through marriages, political alliances and constant population move-
ment. Their sense of identity was also more of a social identity rather 
than a political one (Beach 1984:46; Ranger 1989:121).
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However, Rhodesian colonialism, like colonialism in many other parts 
of Africa, set into motion the politicisation of African ethnic identities 
by trying to construct and reconstruct people’s identities and by com-
partmentalising them in cultural and geographic terms.1 It also polarised 
and reinforced ethnic divisions among Africans, thereby deliberately 
preventing them from developing nationally integrated identities, by 
differentiating among them and favouring certain groups against others 
(Ranger 1985; Chimhundu 1992).
To illustrate, the Rhodesian colonial state, from its very inception in 
1890, introduced laws and institutions which all defined the population 
into racial and ethnic categories: European; Asian and Coloured; and 
Native. Natives or Africans were further classified into various sub-cate-
gories, according to colonial notions of origin and geographical location. 
The world of the natives was made up of a variety of natives: ‘aboriginal 
natives’ and ‘colonial natives’; the ‘Mashona natives’ and the ‘Matebele 
natives’ (Southern Rhodesia 1963:22). Race and ethnicity defined social 
and political relations between members of these different categories 
and also determined one’s access to resources and position in society.
In addition to its categorisation of Africans into distinct groups, the 
Rhodesian colonial state divided the country into ethnicised adminis-
trative units: Mashonaland for Zezuru-speaking Shonas; Matebeleland 
for Ndebele-speaking groups; Fort Victoria (Masvingo) for Karanga-
speaking groups; and Manicaland for Manyikas. Many groups, especially 
those speaking minority languages, were lumped into these ethnicised 
administrative units and their alternative identities ignored. The colonial 
state did not only categorise the country’s nationals in terms of their geo-
graphical places of origin but also enforced their identities through what 
the renowned Ugandan scholar Mahmood Mamdani has called an ‘ethnic 
citizenship’ regulated through a ‘regime of ethnic rights’ (Mamdani 
1 The role of the colonial state in the construction of racial and ethnic identities in Africa 
in general and southern Africa in particular has been well documented in influential 
studies such as Terence Ranger (1985); Leroy Vail (1989); Shula Marks and Stanley 
Trapido (1987); and Heribert Adam and Herman Giliomee (1979).
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2001:29-31, 236-241; Mamdani 1996). In the case of Rhodesia, this idea 
of an ethnic citizenship among Rhodesian Africans was enforced through 
the National Identity Card or Pass Law system, used to classify Africans 
in terms of their village and district of origin. Under this system, which 
was surprisingly carried over into post-independence unreformed, every 
‘Native District’ in the country was represented by a specific numerical 
code and every adult Native was issued a national identity card (chitupa/
situpa), with details indicating one’s rural chief, village and district of 
ancestral origin.
Under this regime of ethnic rights, African people’s access to resources, 
especially communal land in rural areas, could only be attained through 
one’s ethnicity. In the rural sphere, Natives had to adopt or assert their 
identities in order to access important resources like land. Equally, in the 
urban areas the Rhodesian state politicised African ethnic identities by 
according differential rights and privileges to its subjects. In the work 
place, for instance, the colonial state reserved specific jobs for specific 
subject groups, and settler stereotypes produced a hierarchy of wage 
differentials based on ethnic or racial categorisations. On the mines, 
Shangaans were stereotyped as ‘the best workers above and below ground’, 
Zulus as the ‘best drillers’, Ndebeles as the ‘best foremen’ and Manyikas 
and ‘northern boys’ (Malawian and Zambian immigrants) as the ‘best 
house servants’ (Yoshikuni 1989:68; Van Onselen 1976:81, 93; Ranger 
1985). As a result, it was not uncommon for individuals to emphasise 
or claim those identities to open up wider opportunities and increase 
social mobility. The racial and ethnic stratification of Rhodesian society, 
as with other colonial African societies, thus tended to promote group 
exclusivity among subject groups. In this respect, Solomon Mombeshora 
is correct to assert that ‘the seeds of ethnic factor were derived from the 
pre-colonial past, [but] the colonial era provided fertile soil in which 
the ideology of tribalism germinated, blossomed and was further propa-
gated (Mombeshora 1990:431).
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Nationalism and ethnicity
The relationship between ethnicity and African nationalism during 
Zimbabwe’s struggle for independence, as in many other cases on the 
continent, was a complex one (Mkandawire 2005:10-55). Ethnicity 
manifested itself both positively and negatively. One of Zimbabwe’s spe-
cialists on ethnic studies Enocent Msindo (2007:267-290) has recently 
argued that Zimbabwean scholars have not yet fully assessed the complex 
interactions of ethnicity and nationalism, especially their co-existence 
as poplar identities. Distinguishing between ethnicity and tribalism, he 
argues that ‘whereas (political) tribalism is normally the mobilisation 
of ethnically conscious people to foment political enmity and disunity 
between ethnic “others” to the detriment of nationalism, ethnicity, its 
variant, is that capacity in people to classify themselves as social “others”. 
In this endeavour, ethnic groups do not always stand as opponents to the 
development of a nation, but instead may complement efforts at devel-
oping an inclusive nation’ (Msindo 2007:269). Basing his conclusions on 
an analysis of ethnic-based societies, clubs and unions in Bulawayo, such 
as Sons of Mashonaland Cultural Society, Kalanga Cultural Society and 
Matabele Home Society, Msindo argues that in the period 1950-1963 eth-
nicity and nationalism positively fed each other. Ethnic associations were 
the springboard for the emergence of nationalist leaders while ethnicity 
provided the needed pre-colonial heroes, monuments and local expres-
sions of anti-colonial discontent (Msindo 2007:267, 275-276, 289).
During the formative years of mass nationalism in Zimbabwe, ethnicity 
was deployed positively to mobilise the masses. The major nationalist 
parties of the 1950s and early 1960s – such as the Southern Rhodesia 
African National Congress, National Democratic Party and Zimbabwe 
African People’s Union (ZAPU) – all positively deployed ethnicity to 
mobilise the masses. They appealed to ethnic cultural symbols, such as 
the leopard skins worn by pre-colonial Shona chiefs and Nguni hats worn 
by Ndebele indunas, which early nationalist leaders like Joshua Nkomo 
and Leopold Takawira used to wear when addressing the masses.
281
‘Echoing Silences’: Ethnicity in post-colonial Zimbabwe, 1980-2007 
However, from the early 1960s onwards, ethnicity became a divisive force 
in Zimbabwe nationalist politics. Ethnic divisions were mainly caused 
by leadership positioning for the takeover of the state and perceived 
inequalities in political participation by individual nationalist leaders 
and their supporters. In all this tribalism, instead of being an aberra-
tion, became a political resource used by political actors at crucial times 
to maximise personal power. In 1963, ethnicity within the nationalist 
movement led to the fragmentation of ZAPU when a core group of 
Shona-speaking leaders of the party revolted against the leadership of the 
Ndebele-speaking Joshua Nkomo to found a new party, the Zimbabwe 
African National Union (ZANU). The ZAPU-ZANU split resulted in 
faction fights and violence in urban areas, which increasingly took ethnic 
dimensions (Sithole 1984:117-125).
From the 1963 split onwards, the struggle for national independence was 
dominated by ZAPU, comprising mainly Ndebele and Kalanga-speaking 
politicians and fighters, and ZANU, comprising mainly Shona-speaking 
politicians and fighters (Sithole 1999 and Sibanda 2005). After the 1963 
breakaway, ZAPU tried to maintain ethnic balance in its leadership but 
this strategy did not save it from ethnic politics and ethnic-induced crises. 
Some of these ethnic-motivated clashes of the 1970s pitted Ndebele/
Kalanga-speaking politicians, such as Jason Moyo, Edward Ndlovu and 
George Silundika, against their Shona-speaking counterparts, James 
Chikerema and George Nyandoro. They culminated in the second split 
of ZAPU in exile (Sibanda 2005:144-151; Msindo 2004).
As the ethnic dimensions of the rift between ZAPU and ZANU widened, 
animosity and suspicion among ZANU and ZAPU leaders grew, assas-
sinations and detentions of political activists from ‘unwanted ethnic or 
dialect groups’ increased, and recruitment and fighting became more 
ethnicised and regionalised. Shona-speaking recruits increasingly joined 
ZANU in Mozambique while Ndebele recruits joined ZAPU in Zambia 
(Tungamirai 1995; Bhebe 1999). Within the organisational politics of 
these two major nationalist organisations, ZANU and ZAPU, political 
elites also continued to mobilise different ethnicities as an important 
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political resource in contests for power throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 
In the case of ZANU-PF, power contestations were mainly between 
the three main Shona sub-ethnic groups of Manyika or easterners; the 
Karanga or southerners and the Zezuru or northerners. As Masipula 
Sithole has convincingly argued in his Struggles within a Struggle, it was 
tensions within these ethnicities which led to divisions within ZANU 
and to the assassination of Herbert Chitepo, the first Chairman of the 
party (Sithole 1999). Within ZAPU in Zambia, ethnicity fragmented 
the party as the Shona, Kalanga and Ndebele politicians mobilised on 
an ethnic basis (Sithole 1980:28 and Sibanda 2005). The lives of its top 
leaders, such as that of the ZIPRA commander Nikita Mangena, were 
also lost due to this Ndebele/Kalanga-Shona rivalry.
The dominant liberation movements of ZAPU and ZANU indeed tried 
to manage ethnicity within their organisations. Their strategies of man-
aging ethnicity included ethnic balancing in the leadership of the party. 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s both ZAPU and ZANU tried to deal 
with the issue of ethnicity through ethnic representation. ZAPU tried 
to fill its leadership positions with individuals across Ndebele, Shona 
and Kalanga ethnic divides. In ZANU, particular attention was paid to 
achieving balance in leadership by having leaders drawn from the three 
dominant Shona groups: Karanga, Manyika and Zezuru (Sithole 1999). 
At the ideological level, nationalist organisations tried to deal with eth-
nicity through political rhetoric that ignored realities of ethnicity in 
favour of nationalist and Marxist radicalism (Chung 2006).
Despite these efforts, ethnicity continued to manifest itself negatively. 
Part of the problem was the failure of these organisations to develop a 
proper mechanism to deal with the phenomenon. Some of the leading 
nationalists were also not committed to practical eradication of eth-
nicity. They condemned ethnicity during the day but used it by night as 
a political resource in their own battles for power. Zimbabwe was thus 
born with a very bad ethnic birthmark that was to negatively affect its 
national integration efforts.
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The post-colonial nation-state building project  
and ethnicity
Once it got into power in 1980, the nationalist leadership of Zimbabwe 
tried to restructure the inherited colonial racial and ethnic order in a 
number of ways. At the political and ideological levels, it placed emphasis 
on dismantling colonial institutions, laws and practices promoting 
ethnic polarisation. To promote national integration among the ethni-
cally diverse Zimbabwean groups, government employment policies, for 
instance, emphasised the deployment of public servants to places away 
from their districts of origin. The government language policy empha-
sised the teaching of both Shona and Ndebele (the languages of the 
two major African ethnic groups in Zimbabwe) to develop a spirit of 
nationhood among the young. It promoted Ndebele and Shona, along-
side English, as official national languages and introduced them in the 
curricula in formerly white-only schools. The other minority languages, 
such as Kalanga, Shangani, Chewa (Nyanja), Venda, Tonga and Nambya, 
were also officially recognised for use in education and on radio (Makoni, 
Dube & Mashiri 2006).
The government also tried to change group attitudes through the pro-
motion of political reconciliation between the previously antagonistic 
and disintegrated groups of the nation. For example, the Shona-Ndebele 
ethnic divide which had been amplified during the days of the struggle was 
to be achieved through the promotion of political cooperation between 
ZANU-PF and ZAPU, the two antagonistic nationalist parties which had 
both assumed ethno-regional characters by the time of independence. 
The first government to be formed after 1980 independence elections 
was thus to include not only members from the defeated Rhodesian 
Front government but also individuals from ZAPU, which had been 
defeated at the polls by its rival nationalist organisation, ZANU-PF. The 
new army was also an integrated unit, consisting of combatants from 
both ZANLA and ZIPRA, on the one hand, and Rhodesian units, on the 
other (Rupiya 1995). 
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In spite of all these de-ethnicisation processes, Zimbabwe struggled to 
develop into a united nation-state because of its negative legacy of racial 
and ethnic polarisation inherited from both colonialism and African 
nationalism. The suspicions and ethnic tensions developed, as well as 
alliances built, during colonial rule and the nationalist struggle did not 
immediately disappear after independence. They continued to shape 
relations between political elites in the post-independence (Rich 1982; 
Sylvester 1986). The ZANU-PF government tried to deal with ethnicity 
and maintain the unity of both the state and the party through persua-
sion and coercion. However, as Mandaza has correctly pointed out in 
his introduction of Edgar Tekere’s recently published biography, ethnic/
regional tensions continued to be dominant in the contest for power 
within ZANU-PF and the state (Mandaza 2006).
Ethnicity was enacted and reproduced through a number of sites and 
processes during the early years of independence. The first site for the 
enactment of ethnicity involved the conflict between ZANU-PF and 
PF ZAPU which had constituted itself as the major opposition party in 
Zimbabwe following ZANU-PF’s victory in the 1980 election. Though 
originating as a political conflict between the two leading nationalist 
parties with contrasting visions about their roles in the post-independence 
state, this conflict soon assumed ethnic dimensions through a number 
of events and processes.2 First and foremost, there was ZANU-PF’s con-
troversial use of party slogans, songs and political speeches that not only 
valorised ZANU-PF and ZANLA as authentic liberators while dispar-
aging ZAPU, ZIPRA and its supporters (represented as constituting a 
distinct ethnic group) as villains (Alexander 1998:151-182; Dabengwa 
1995). The ZANU-PF government also inaugurated a narrow official 
narrative of liberation history which downplayed and denigrated ZAPU 
and other nationalist parties’ role. This historical moment of ZANU-PF 
triumphalism was also characterised by the use of Shona pre-colonial 
2 From the time of independence in 1980, ZANU envisaged Zimbabwe as a one-party 
state while ZAPU regarded itself as an official opposition party in a multiparty 
democracy.
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heroes and historical monuments to imagine the nation, while Ndebele 
heroes and history were marginalised (Kriger 2003:74-75).
Helping to develop a sense of marginalisation among former ZIPRA 
combatants was the preferential treatment of ZANLA cadres in the 
Zimbabwe National Army and sidelining of ZIPRA. Examples of this 
were the promotion of former ZANLA combatants, ahead of their former 
ZIPRA colleagues, to senior military positions within the new ZNA. 
These and other grievances led to military clashes between ZIPRA and 
ZANLA in Assembly Points of Ntumbane, Ntabazinduna, Connemara 
and Chitungwiza in the early 1980s. These simmering tensions came to a 
head in 1982 with the discovery of arms caches in ZAPU-owned proper-
ties around Bulawayo and Gweru. The ZANU-PF government reacted 
by arresting a number of ZAPU leaders and ZIPRA commanders, and 
sacked ZAPU leaders in the coalition government, including the ZAPU 
leader Joshua Nkomo. All this exacerbated feelings of marginalisation 
among ZAPU leaders and their supporters, including some ZIPRA ex-
combatants. A few of these politically dissatisfied individuals expressed 
their disgruntlement by taking up arms to fight for a ‘better deal’ 
(Ranger, Alexander & McGregor 2000:180-196).
Utilising this opportunity to crush its only viable opponent in the 
post-independence period, the ZANU-PF government deployed both 
the army and a special militia unit – the Fifth Brigade or Gukurahundi 
(the rain that sweeps the chaff) – to suppress the few rebels. The violent 
and brutal method used by the Fifth Brigade seriously destabilised the 
regions of Matebeleland and Midlands between 1982 and 1987. More 
than 20 000 civilians were killed by these government forces battling 
to contain the activities of a few armed political rebels. As detailed 
in the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) and the 
Legal Resources Foundation (LRF)’s report, Breaking the Silence, the 
Fifth Brigade’s military operation became a bizarre combination of 
random killing, abduction and torture of ZAPU supporters and Ndebele-
speaking civilians, raping of women and girls, cultural imperialism, 
conducted through attempts to force Ndebele-speakers to speak Shona 
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only, and indoctrination aimed at forcing people to support ZANU-PF 
(CCJP & LRF 1997).
The violence and killings of this period only ended in 1987 after the 
signing of the Unity Accord between ZANU and ZAPU and the merging 
of the two parties into the Zimbabwe African National Union-Popular 
Front (ZANU-PF). But, the atrocities of this period have remained a 
bitter source of resentment among the country’s Ndebele population, 
who also feel marginalised from both central government decision-
making processes and the economy (Ranger, Alexander & McGregor 
2000; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003). The lingering bitterness of the people 
towards the central government has been evident in people’s voting pat-
terns. Since the end of the killings in 1987, ZANU-PF has struggled to get 
votes from the provinces of Matebeleland. 
Bjorn Lingren (2005:156-158), who did fieldwork on ethnicity in 
Matabeleland, has argued that one of the serious consequences of the 
Gukurahundi atrocities is that it solidified the feeling of Ndebele-ness 
among the people of Matabeleland that is currently making national inte-
gration very difficult to achieve. He noted that ‘people in Matabeleland 
accused Mugabe, the government and the “Shona” in general of killing the 
Ndebele’ (Lingren 2005:158). In the eyes of the Ndebele public, what was 
portrayed as a mission to stamp out dissidents became an anti-Ndebele 
campaign that deliberately conflated Joshua Nkomo, ZAPU, ex-ZIPRA 
and every Ndebele-speaking person into a dissident; a dissident collabo-
rator; a dissident sympathiser and sponsor. This is mainly because the 
Fifth Brigade unit was almost entirely Shona and justified its violence 
in political and ethnic terms. For others, the violence and killings of the 
period, therefore, represented a ‘Shona-crusade to make the Ndebele 
account for the nineteenth century raids on the Shona’. The state, in the 
eyes of most residents of Matebeleland and Midlands who endured the 
killings and violence, thus not only became tribalist, using ethnicity to 
suppress political dissent and to monopolise power (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2003; Ranger, Alexander & McGregor 2000:204-231).
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The consequences of this violence of the 1980s on the nation-building 
project have been dire and far-reaching. The ethnic nature of this state-
sanctioned violence not only left many Ndebeles more aware of their 
differences with the Shona, but also provoked radical Ndebele cultural 
nationalism and radical Ndebele politics (Lingren 2005). This radical pol-
itics has sometimes been contesting the idea of a unitary Zimbabwe state. 
This spirit of radical ‘Ndebele particularism’ manifested itself through 
the formation of radical Ndebele pressure groups in the 1990s, such as 
Vukani Mahlabezulu and Imbovane Yamahlabezulu, focusing on a revival 
of particularistic features of Ndebele culture (Chikuhwa 2004:93). The 
more political-oriented groups include ZAPU 2000, a belated attempt 
to revive ZAPU following the death of Joshua Nkomo in July 1999, as 
well as Mthwakazi Action Group on Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in 
Matabeleland and Midlands and Mthwakazi People’s Congress (MPC), 
both diaspora groups concentrating on the issues of the Gukurahundi 
violence and government accountability for it (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003).
Arguing against what it views as the continued marginalisation of 
the three provinces of Matebeleland South, Matebeleland North and 
Midlands, ZAPU 2000 agitates for a Federal state in which provinces 
retain greater political and economic autonomy. It has repudiated the 
Unity Accord which it has described as an elitist pact. The two Mthwakazi 
organisations, on the other hand, have agitated for Ndebele self-determi-
nation and have called for the establishment of an autonomous Ndebele 
state (United Mthwakazi Republic) (Mthwakazi Action Group 2006). All 
these organisations have tried to develop a regional/ethnic support based 
on Ndebele popular resentment of the neglect of the western region 
and perceived hegemony of the majority Shona ethnic group. While the 
social pressure groups such as Imbovane have managed to attract mass 
support, the separatist political groups have received limited support. 
For instance, ZAPU 2000 attained only 0.4% of the vote in the 2002 
presidential election, and did not even participate in the last 2005 parlia-
mentary elections (Electoral Institute of Southern Africa 2007).
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Separatist organisations have rather found more support among the 
young generations of Diaspora political activists from Matabeleland 
who have become sceptical of the territorial nationalism of ZANU-PF 
which they regard as a Shona tribal party. Ndebele ethnicity has become 
a major issue in the Diaspora, where displaced Ndebele communities are 
linking up via the internet, through web-based forums such as inkundla.
net, and other public forums to promote a distinct Ndebele political 
identity. The more radical groups and individuals have gone to the extent 
of imagining an autonomous independent nation-state, built on a re-
imagination of both pre-colonial history and a recounting of the recent 
history of the Fifth Brigade atrocities. The radicals have claimed a sepa-
rate history from their Shona compatriots and have sought to appropriate 
the nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo, ZAPU and ZIPRA as the property 
and heritage of the Ndebele rather than the nation at large. They have 
basically provincialised Ndebele identity and tried to construct it as an 
antithesis to Shona identity and political power (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 1997; 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003; Mthwakazi Action Group 2006).
Inside Zimbabwe, Ndebele ethnicity has continued to revolve around 
key developmental issues. These include complaints about the side-
lining of the western regions in development projects, and perceived 
marginalisation of Ndebele people in both the economy and politics by 
the dominant Shona groups. Following the Unity Accord, the people of 
Matebeleland had expected affirmative action in terms of development 
projects since their regions had lagged behind in economic develop-
ment during the Gukurahundi days. Shona-Ndebele tensions in urban 
centres like Bulawayo have centred on limited employment and edu-
cational facilities, with Ndebeles accusing their Shona counterparts of 
taking ‘their jobs and vacancies at teacher and nurse training colleges’. 
The former Mayor of Bulawayo in the 1990s, Joshua Malinga, the late 
MP Sydney Malunga and the former Governor of Matebeleland North, 
Welshman Mabhena, were the most vociferous in airing Ndebele feelings 
of marginalisation (Financial Gazette 2004). The discussions on provi-
sion of water to the city of Bulawayo from the Zambezi River are also 
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entangled in Shona-Ndebele ethnic politics. Muchaparara Musemwa has 
described the politics around the Zambezi Water Project, particularly the 
reluctance of the government to sponsor this project, as a continuation 
of ‘ZANU-PF’s disciplining of a dissident city’ (Musemwa 2006).
Ethnic polarisation has not just developed between the Shona and the 
Ndebele, but also among the various Shona groups – the Karanga, the 
Manyika, the Zezuru, the Korekore and the Ndau, which have accused 
and counter-accused each other of ethnic favouritism. Minority groups 
like the Shangaan, Kalanga, Tonga and Venda, located in the marginal 
borderlands with little economic development and less physical and 
social infrastructure, have felt marginalised from both the economy and 
society and have complained of political and cultural domination by both 
Shonas and Ndebeles. In the field of education, for instance, children of 
the minority language groups generally have little access to education 
in their mother tongue as these languages are taught in schools only up 
to the 3rd grade. Thereafter, Shona and Ndebele become the only indig-
enous languages on offer, meaning that children from these minority 
groups have to switch to them since the curriculum requires children to 
study at least one local language (Hachipola 1998).
The marginalisation of minority group languages in education and 
other national policies has particularly become a sore point around 
which political mobilisation of these groups has occurred. On a number 
of occasions, community leaders among these minority groups have 
complained against what they perceive to be Shona or Ndebele cultural 
imperialism enforced through government policies, such as its national 
language policy and employment policies. In the case of the southern 
border town of Beitbridge, for instance, the issue of language has become 
so politicised that it is has become an important mark enforcing iden-
tity group boundaries between the local Venda-speaking groups and 
Shonas, considered outsiders (Mathe 2005:8-20). Shona-Venda tension 
in Beitbridge came to a boiling point in 2002 when a group of ‘war vet-
erans’ dismissed the head of primary school in the district, allegedly 
because she was employing mainly Shona teachers, and not Vendas. 
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The Shangani-speaking communities in the south-western parts of the 
country have over the years also complained about the employment of 
‘Karangas (derogatively termed vanyai or foreigners) ahead of their sons 
and daughters’ (Author’s personal experiences, January-March 1988).
Local feelings about marginalisation in both politics and the economy 
as well as intensified competition for limited resources like productive 
land have equally given potency to the growth of a strong politicised 
Shangani ethnicity in this part of the country. Competition over rights 
to land has periodically provoked ethnically motivated violence between 
Shangani-speaking and Karanga-speaking groups living side by side. 
In the period leading to the 2000 election, the ZANU-PF Member of 
Parliament for Chiredzi South, Aaron Baloyi, allegedly incited Shangani 
villagers in Chilonga village to evict all Karanga villagers settled in the 
area. About 400 villagers, armed with sticks and spears, attacked live-
stock, uprooted crops, destroyed property and houses belonging to 
their Karanga-speaking neighbours (Daily News 2001). Many Shangani 
ethnic mobilisers have continued to complain about their ‘land being 
taken over by the Karangas’. Ethnic relations between Shangani and 
Karangas have become even more polarised since the death of Baloyi in 
2006 and his succession by a Karanga-speaking Member of Parliament 
(Zimbabwe Standard 2007).
Contested rights to land and to movement on ethnic or regional grounds 
have been a common feature in post-colonial Zimbabwe, and a number of 
individuals have been denied access to land or evicted in various parts of 
the country by both political elites and peasants opposed to any attempts 
by ‘outsiders’ to settle in their ‘ancestral’ lands.3 For instance, in 2002 
the Daily News reported that a ZANU-PF Member of Parliament for 
the Mashonaland Central district of Muzarabani, Nobbie Dzinzi, had 
instigated local villagers to evict ‘Karangas in Muzarabani’ for ‘being 
Karangas in an area indigenous to the Korekore people’ (Daily News 2002). 
3 The general understanding among many rural communities is that individuals have 
eminent rights (based on history, origin and ethnicity) to certain pieces of land. See 
Marongwe (2002) for a more detailed discussion of this issue. 
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In 2003, when the Mashonaland-born, Coloured businessman and pub-
lisher, Ibbo Mandaza, tried to occupy his newly acquired farm in the 
Bubi district of Matabeleland North province, his move was strongly 
resisted by local peasants on the basis of both ethnicity and region-
alism. Local war veterans and ZANU-PF politicians who, according to 
newspapers, had ‘publicly stated their unhappiness with the allocation 
of the farm to Mandaza whom they consider an outsider’ had allegedly 
mobilised these locals to bar him from settling on this prime farmland 
(Zimbabwe Standard 2003; Zimbabwe Independent 2004).
Though not as intense as Shona-Ndebele conflict, intra-group conflict 
among the various Shona groups has always been a feature of their rela-
tions since independence in 1980. The Karangas, Manyikas and Ndaus 
have complained about the dominance of the Zezurus in politics and 
economy. Since the early 1980s, a politicised Ndau identity, revolving 
around the controversial ousting of Ndabaningi Sithole, a Ndau-speaker 
from Chipinge, from the leadership of ZANU in 1975 and the eco-
nomic marginalisation of the remote eastern districts of the country 
bordering Mozambique, manifested itself in the way residents related 
to the state. ZANU-Ndonga successfully mobilised this Ndau ethnicity 
against a ZANU-PF government led by Robert Mugabe who replaced 
Sithole as leader. Until 2005 when the two parliamentary seats were won 
by ZANU-PF and MDC (Movement for Democratic Change, the people 
of these districts consistently supported and voted ZANU-Ndonga – a 
situation which led many commentators to view the party as a tribal 
organisation since these were the only districts where the party managed 
to attract support. During the Mozambican civil war, the dynamics of 
Ndau ethnic politics were also at play when some inhabitants of these 
remote eastern districts expressed their frustrations with both the lack of 
development in their region and the government’s handling of the war 
by offering support to RENAMO (Alao 1994:122-123).
Since 1980, post-colonial expressions of ethnicity have also been strong 
in Masvingo, where the late nationalist Eddison Zvobgo tried to mobilise 
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Karanga identity to dilute what he and others viewed as Zezuru monopoly 
over power and resources. From independence, Karanga political elites 
and their supporters constituted themselves as another centre of power 
that could not be ignored in power calculations and politics of ethnic 
balancing (Mandaza 2006; Rukuni 2003). The roots of this politicised 
Karanga ethnicity go back to the days of the struggle when contestations 
for power were mainly between the Karanga and the Manyika (Sithole 
1999). But, after independence their ethnicity was mainly derived from 
perceptions, both real and imagined, about marginalisation. At the 
moment, Karanga ethnicity has been revived by the ongoing succes-
sion struggle in ZANU-PF which has, to a large extent, taken ethnic and 
regional dimensions (Zimbabwe Institute 2006).
Ethnicity and power contestations in  
contemporary Zimbabwe
In spite of all official pretences to the contrary, Zimbabwe has increas-
ingly become ethnically polarised. As in the 1970s, ethnic and regional 
tensions have been quite dominant in the power contestations within 
both the ruling ZANU-PF and the opposition Movement for Democratic 
Change. Zezuru, Manyika, Karanga and Ndebele ethno-regional iden-
tities have become the main basis through which power has been 
contested. The dominant factions in the ongoing struggle for succession 
of the leadership of ZANU-PF and the country, for instance, have all 
mobilised on regional and ethnic basis (Zimbabwe Institute 2006). To 
illustrate, there are heavy Zezuru ethnic undertones in both the Mujuru 
and Mugabe factions struggling for the leadership of ZANU-PF. The 
leading proponents of Mugabe’s continued stay in office, such as Nathan 
Shamuyarira, Webster Shamu, Ignatious Chombo and Nicholas Goche 
are by and large Zezuru-speaking elites drawn from Mashonaland West 
province. In terms of ethnic and regional classification, the majority of 
leaders in the Mujuru camp are Zezurus originating from the Chikomba 
and Chivhu districts of Mashonaland East province. The Mujuru faction 
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is often referred to in the media as the Chivhu Corridor Group (CCG) 
or ‘Super Zezuru’ because of the ethno-regional undertones in its leader-
ship and membership (Zimbabwe Institute 2006).
The Zezuru character of these two factions has invoked fears of Zezuru 
political dominance among political elites from other provinces outside 
Mashonaland. These include Masvingo, and Midlands (dominated 
by Karanga-speaking groups) as well as Matabeleland (dominated 
by Ndebele-speaking groups). There are also rumblings of discontent 
in Manicaland province (dominated by Manyika and Ndau-speaking 
groups), and Emmerson Mnangagwa and his faction have tried to mobi-
lise their fears. As a result, Mnangagwa has a significant support base in 
his home province of Midlands, large parts of Masvingo province and the 
two provinces of Matebeleland North and Matebeleland South who all 
feel politically marginalised from the current configurations of power in 
ZANU-PF. The Mnangagwa group is, therefore, also tainted with ethnic 
politics, and it is sometimes referred to as ‘South-South’ group because 
of its attempt to mobilise on a regional basis. The convergence of griev-
ance and resentment among various groups and constituencies has thus 
given rise to highly ethnicised politics in Zimbabwe.
The MDC has since its formation in 1999 been similarly plagued by the 
same ethnic and regional tendencies that have weakened ZANU-PF. Six 
years of infighting along regional and ethnic fault lines, as well as disa-
greements over strategy, accountability and violence within the party, 
eventually resulted in a split in October 2005 (Raftopoulos 2005; Magaisa 
2005; Financial Gazette 2005). The MDC split resulted in two forma-
tions of the same party, one led by party-founding president Morgan 
Tsvangirai and another led by the radical former student leader, Arthur 
Mutambara and founding Secretary-General, Welshman Ncube. Since 
their split, both factions have been viewed as ethno-regional forma-
tions commanding regional support rather than national support. The 
Mutambara and Ncube faction has commanded more support in the 
Ndebele-speaking constituencies of Matabeleland and Midlands, whilst 
the Tsvangirai group has had more support in the Shona-speaking 
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constituencies of Harare, Masvingo and Mashonaland and Manicaland 
(Moyo 2006; Moyo 2007).
Conclusion
The trajectory and process of nation building in post-colonial Africa 
has always been a complex and tricky affair, especially in countries such 
as Zimbabwe that inherited a highly fragmented society, divided along 
racial and ethnic fault lines. This article has argued that for the last 27 
years ethnic tension has remained rife in Zimbabwe mainly because of 
the politics of silence. This silence has been experienced at two levels: 
the state and society. At the societal level, the politics of silence has been 
evident in the way members of society either avoid or try to silence all 
debates about ethnicity in the country. At the official level, the state’s 
politics of silence has been experienced in the ZANU-PF government’s 
reluctance to engage ethnicity as an issue in both politics and the 
economy, especially with regard to addressing historical and contem-
porary factors that continued to make ethnicity an important issue in 
people’s lives. The government silence over, or failure to respond to, eth-
nicity was particularly evident in its nation-building project, especially its 
coercive nation-building and state-building projects of the early 1980s, 
which paid little attention to the ethnic configuration of the inherited 
state, as well as the structures and institutions which enacted and repro-
duced ethnicity. Zimbabwe’s failure to build social, cultural and political 
systems in which all citizens stand in the same relation to the state and 
feel equally incorporated into the structures of both political and eco-
nomic power has thus ensured that ethnicity, alongside race, continues 
to matter to Zimbabweans.
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